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II. Interview
In Conversation with Morten Storm: 
A Double Agent’s Journey into the Global Jihad
Interviewed by Stefano Bonino
his interview with former double agent Morten Storm can serve as a unique case study for academics and 
security practitioners wishing to understand the turbulent path that led a young Danish man to turn into a 
Muslim, later on embrace violent jihad, and ultimately work for four diferent Western intelligence agencies in 
the War on Terror. he interview identiies the struggles of a man in search of identity and belonging. It provides 
unique insights into the world of violent jihad and ofers an understanding of the key role played by double 
agents in disrupting international terrorist networks. he interview further highlights the operational challenges 
inherent in cooperating with diferent Western intelligence agencies and the personal challenges underpinning 
undercover operations.
About Morten Storm
M
orten Storm was born in Korsør, Denmark, on 2 January 1976. He was raised in a turbulent family 
and quickly became immersed in the criminal world: drugs, armed robberies and prisons were a 
daily reality for the young Dane. A member of the Bandidos motorcycle gang at 19, two years later 
he converted to Islam in a Danish prison, moved to England and then traveled to Yemen, where he learnt 
Arabic and was drawn into jihadism. Between 1997 and 2006 Storm divided his time between Denmark, 
England and Yemen and befriended some of the most senior leaders of al-Qaeda (such as Nasir al-Wuhayshi 
and Anwar al-Awlaki), the radical preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed, 9/11 terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui, 
the ‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid and many other violent jihadists. A sudden change of heart led Storm to 
privately abandon Islam in 2007. Yet, publicly, he maintained his jihadi persona while working on joint 
missions for Danish, British and American intelligence agencies: the Politiets Eterretningstjeneste (PET); the 
Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6); and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Storm travelled the world, gathering information on al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups and 
helped Western authorities prevent several murderous attacks. Storm’s most important task involved helping 
the CIA track and assassinate his friend Anwar al-Awlaki. Ater securing a $250,000 reward for setting up al-
Awlaki with a Croatian wife but failing to lead the CIA to al-Awlaki, in 2011, Storm went on his last mission, 
worth a $5 million reward. Storm was to help the CIA track al-Awlaki by arranging meetings with al-
Awlaki’s couriers. Al-Awlaki was eventually killed on 30 September that year but the $5 million reward never 
materialized. Storm claims that it was his intelligence that led to the death of al-Awlaki. In October 2012 he 
went public with his story in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. In 2014 the International Spy Museum in 
Washington opened an exhibit on Morten Storm. Today, Storm is hiding in fear for his life.
Stefano Bonino (SB): Can you tell me a bit about your story in terms of your path from being a member of the 
‘Bandidos’ to converting to Islam?
Morten Storm (MS): I grew up with no dad and always felt frustrated and angry. In my teens, I took up 
boxing, took drugs and started committing armed robberies for the adrenaline. In 1995, at 19, I joined the 
Bandidos in Denmark. In 1997, I was the president of the Bandidos in Korsør and Slagelse: I ended up in 
jail for six months for assault. I was rearrested while on remand for armed robbery but the charges were 
dropped. I decided that I wanted to become a better person so I let the biker gang and went to Milton 
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Keynes in England. I became a Muslim. At that point, in 1997, I was someone who did not have an identity, 
who did not have a higher purpose in life. What attracted me to Islam in the irst place was the need to 
belong to something, as I did not have a good family. he turning point for me was reading a book on the life 
of the Prophet Mohammed that I found in the library in Milton Keynes. It made so much more sense than 
Christianity because God was not portrayed as a human and there was no Trinity. It was the monotheistic 
concept behind Islam that attracted me. For the irst six months ater I converted to Islam, I was so happy. 
Finally, I had a purpose in life. Praying everyday made me feel like I was forgiven for my sins. here was a 
family there for me: I belonged to a global community of 1.6 billion Muslims. hey make you feel that you 
are one of them: the Pakistani community was a bit reserved but the Arabs and the Somalis were much more 
open. But if I had to say what motivated me to convert the most, I would say that, in the beginning, it was the 
‘social’ aspect of Islam. Islam is a complete way of life. Everything is decided for you. When you use the toilet, 
you need to use it in a certain way. When you eat and drink, you need to do it in a certain way. When you 
have sex with your wife, you have it in a certain way. So everything is totally decided for you. A Muslim aims 
to do everything that the Prophet Mohammed did in his life and to emulate him. You have to imitate him. 
Later on, my motivation to be a Muslim changed when religion and faith took over the social aspect.
SB: And then what happened?
MS: During my time in England, I started attending Regent’s Park Mosque. At the time I was not yet a 
fundamentalist Muslim, but Regent’s Park Mosque was one of the reasons that turned me into one. he 
mosque is partly funded by Saudi Arabia and they follow Salaism or an orthodox form of Islam that adheres 
to the Hanbali school of thought. In North Africa there are the Maliki; in Asia there are the Hanai; in 
Yemen there are the Shai. hey are all diferent schools of thought but they are all fundamentalist. A Saudi 
imam working at Regent’s Park Mosque suggested that I should go to Yemen to study Islam. At that time, 
I was still quite ignorant about Islam: all what I knew was that there was a diference between Sunni and 
Shia Muslims! I accepted the ofer and of I went to Yemen to study Islam in Dammaj. I quickly realized 
that there was more to Islam: it is based upon both the Koran and the Hadith. he Hadith explains how to 
understand the Koran. So I studied the six books of the Hadith. I became a fundamentalist: I started doing 
everything in life following the Koran and the Hadith. For me they were based on evidence rather than 
worship. I also learnt that a Muslim cannot like disbelievers even if they are his own parents. hat is what I 
read and what I studied with others in Yemen. I learnt that the highest goal of Islam is to love for the sake 
of Allah and to hate for the sake of Allah. Everything that you do in your beliefs must be pure. Faith – or 
iman – must be manifested in your speeches and actions, not only in your heart. Once you are in there, it 
is so easy to become a fundamentalist. You become like a robot with no emotions. It is very easy especially 
if your previous life lacked a daily routine: Islam will make it for you. hat is fundamentalist Islam. he 
two authentic books of the Hadith are followed by most of Muslims. Ater four months in Dammaj, I went 
to Sana’a where I met several Yemenis who had trained with al-Qaeda militants in Afghanistan. I also met 
one of Osama bin Laden’s couriers. So I really started to know al-Qaeda members. In 1998, I moved back 
to Milton Keynes and attended hard-core mosques across London: I met Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard 
Reid, for example. Later, I started preaching to non-Muslims (da‘wah). I used to preach in street corners, 
such as Oxford Street in London. I always used the argument that the Koran had never changed and had been 
protected against all contradictions while the Bible contradicts itself in many places and had been changed. 
hat was my basic argument and I converted many people. For me, reading the Koran literally encouraged 
hatred, discrimination, intolerance and incitement to violence. I returned to Yemen in January 2001 to study 
in Sana’a and just a few months before 9/11 I received an invitation from Osama bin Laden to join him up in 
the training camps in Afghanistan. I did not go to Afghanistan but later in 2002, I named my son Osama in 
honor of bin Laden: he was someone who dared to challenge America. I understood before 9/11 that violent 
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jihad is part of Islam: it is the highest action you can perform. here is nothing compared to jihad in Islam. I 
knew that jihad was part of Islam but it was really ater 9/11 that two camps emerged: Muslims became split 
between those who were practicing and those who were non-practicing. In Yemen, people were cheering for 
the attacks on America. Later, I raised money and recruited people to ight for the Taliban during the war 
in Afghanistan. In 2002, ater my son was born, I returned to Denmark and then I moved to Luton with my 
family and started mixing up with followers of Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Omar Bakri Mohammed. So, 
for example, I burnt the American lag outside the American Embassy in London in 2005. I celebrated the 
bombings on London in 2005, although I was not too convinced about the killings of civilians. hen I met 
Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2006. He was very diferent from the preachers in England. He convinced me 
to join the real jihad.
SB: Surely you must have seen a diference between the non-violent fundamentalists and the violent ones?
MS: We called the non-violent fundamentalists ‘Saudi Salais’ because they were not ‘real’ Salais. In 2005, 
I even wrote a book titled ‘Exposing the Fake Salais.’ We made an e-book and distributed it all over. hese 
‘fake’ Salais would quote the Hadith but not the full meaning of it. hey would never speak about jihad. We 
considered the Saudi Salais who opposed jihad to be hypocrites because they only wanted to believe some 
parts of the Koran. he ‘real’ Salais and the jihadists would accept the Koran in full. But I deinitely saw 
people from rich Saudi families who wanted to blow themselves up. hey could not wait. hey were seeking 
martyrdom. his is diferent from Japanese kamikazes or the Tamil Tigers who did it for nationalistic reasons. 
Jihadists do it for religious reasons.
SB: How were violent jihadists recruited?
MS: Initially, in the 1990s, jihad was mostly conined to Chechnya and there were training camps in 
Afghanistan. he big jihad had not started yet. People got recruited via books and imams, and especially via 
contacts, such as people who were linked to Osama bin Laden and to Afghanistan and to the mujahidin. 
hese were people like Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid and other people whom I befriended at the 
mosque. hey were like-minded people who were fundamentalist and accepted violent jihad as part of Islam. 
You just met them in the mosque and had a few debates, a few talks. hen you wake up and realize that the 
Saudi Salais only gave you half of the story. You have the full meaning of the Koran and the Hadith. All of 
the beheadings and all of the success stories of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Fallujah and other places were 
an incredible boost. Early on, we were a bit discouraged when the Taliban were pushed out of Kabul to the 
mountains. It felt as a defeat but now you look back and they are still ighting. It was just a tactical move. So 
many years later, it was a proof to the believers that the prophecy would be fulilled and that an Islamic State 
would happen. Anwar al-Awlaki used to lecture about the fact that jihad in Syria would be revived and come 
back to life. At that time, in 2006, it was impossible to think that there would be an Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq. Sure, in Iraq there was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi but in Syria Bashar al-Assad was too strong. But it 
happened. In 2006, al-Awlaki was saying it would happen and indeed it happened.
SB: Did the violent jihadists that you met have direct links with established terrorist groups?
MS: You do not necessarily need to have a direct link with a terrorist group to act. You only need to be 
motivated. Some of the people whom I knew would follow Abu Hamza al-Masri or Abu Qatada. Others 
would follow Somali imams. Others would go to the Saudi Salais. But in a defensive jihad, you do not need 
an emir. hat is one of the rules of jihad. You do not need to ask permission from a leader, from parents 
or from anyone. You can go and ight jihad. Some of the people whom I met never said anything. Taimur 
Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi Swedish man whom I knew in Luton later went to Sweden and blew himself 
56ISSN  2334-3745 February 2016
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 1
up. We used to study the Koran together during lessons and he was actually against jihad and al-Qaeda. I 
used to look down on him because I felt that he was a hypocrite. hen a few years later, he blew himself up. 
his was a time when so much literature was available that people were not excused by those like me for 
being ignorant: they could easily self-radicalize.
SB: How did al-Qaeda operate when you were involved in it?
MS: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was fairly hierarchical. You had an emir at the top. When I pleaded 
allegiance to al-Qaeda, I did it to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. here 
is a hierarchy. In European groups, if there were three people, an emir had to be appointed. hese were 
trusted people who spoke and acted on behalf of al-Qaeda. It was a connected network. he main goal of 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was to eventually establish a Caliphate worldwide. Anwar al-Awlaki used 
a Hadith that talks about the ‘army’ of Yemen, which would rise, enter Rome and build an Islamic State. 
Al-Awlaki used to say that we were in a defensive jihad and we had to ight by any means necessary. here 
was no ‘contract of peace’ in place and any such contract between the Muslim world and the West would be 
invalid anyway. Muslim leaders who had made agreements with the West were considered to be traitors as 
they had no authority over Muslims. he goal was also to weaken the economy of the Western world: for 
example, the attacks on London in 2005 cost a fortune to the British government. For many of us, taking 
welfare beneits from the British government was also part of jihad because it weakened its inancial system. 
We were also encouraged to take money from the disbelievers. Breeding and outnumbering the disbelievers 
was part of a strategy and a long-term project too. For us, it was about having a foot in the country, 
expanding mosques, converting people to Islam and one day eventually Islam would spread like a cancer and 
take over the country.
SB: How much talk was going on about Western military involvement in Muslim countries during your time 
spent in Yemen?
MS: Jihad came up because of Western involvement in Muslim lands. Verses of the Koran were recited when 
Afghanistan and Iraq were being invaded. he Koran orders a reaction to invasion. Most of the khutbah 
or Friday prayers mentioned Israel or the American invasion of Iraq. hey also discussed the atrocities of 
women and children being killed. hen there were the scandals of Abu Ghraib, people being randomly killed 
and so on. Islam would be used to justify the fact that those deaths warranted jihad. hat is where religion 
says that it is an obligatory duty to ight jihad and protect Muslim lands from transgressors. he Prophet 
Mohammed promised punishment for those who do not go forward. It is in the Koran. For these people, it is 
a matter of being rewarded in the hereater. he justiication is that if you attack a Muslim country, you attack 
Islam.
SB: Going back to your own conversion to Islam and your path to fundamentalism, why did you decide to 
disengage and leave Islam in the end?
MS: I had a big problem with Islam: the idea of preordained divine destiny was always nagging me 
throughout. It was one of the reasons that made me question Islam in the end. At that time, in 2006, I also 
wanted to join jihad in Somalia. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed had just been overthrown and sharia law 
was being implemented. Somalia was to become the irst real Islamic state and so it was the duty of every 
Muslim to support the cause. Jihad is the noblest cause and Muslims would be punished for not taking part. 
Many Danish and American friends had gone there to ight. So, I gathered military supplies in Denmark and 
said goodbye to my children. But just a couple of days before departing, they called me from Somalia saying 
that they lost the airport in Mogadishu to Ethiopian troops and I could not go any longer because it was too 
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dangerous. I was so angry and I thought ‘why would Allah stop me?’ I felt so betrayed: the incident made me 
seriously question Islam. It made me question the religion. I googled ‘contradictions in the Koran’ and, to my 
surprise, I found hundreds of them. What shocked me even more is that the Koran had been changed and 
had been corrupted from its origins. I lost all faith in Islam immediately.
SB: But you did not just leave Islam. You switched sides and ended up working for four diferent Western 
intelligence agencies. Why did you do that?
MS: I switched sides because I let Islam. I had been approached by intelligence agencies several times and 
refused their ofers. Chapter 5, verse 51 of the Koran says: ‘O you who have believed, do not take the Jews 
and the Christians as allies. hey are allies in one another.’ here are many other verses in the Koran that tell 
Muslims not to cooperate with non-Muslims. But, I understood how much hatred and intolerance were in 
Islam. Jihadists would have killed me if they had known that I was no longer a Muslim. But for me, it became 
a duty as a human being to ight the jihadi ideology so I contacted the Danish intelligence. hey had already 
tried to recruit me. I called the same phone number and we arranged a meeting. I told them that I was no 
longer a Muslim. I told them that I wanted to eat some bacon and drink a beer—they could not believe it!
SB: Was money a factor in your decision to work for intelligence agencies?
MS: Money was not my motivation. Many spies who work for intelligence agencies do it for the money. My 
drive was to see change and do something good. At the beginning, the pay was about $1,500 a month, about 
10,000 Danish Koruna. I used a company called Storm Building Construction as a cover for the income. he 
payments that I received barely did more than cover my bills but I never complained: I knew that I was doing 
the right thing. Knowing that I was making a diference was my real reward.
SB: And what exactly was your role?
MS: I believe that my role was both (1) collecting and passing information and (2) disrupting terrorist 
groups. We prevented terrorism, we prevented people from travelling to Denmark, we prevented shooters 
from spraying bullets like recently in France, we stopped a plot in the United Kingdom. We had information 
on the plans of both al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula because I was a facilitator in Somalia 
and Yemen. We knew what they were planning and we had an idea of what they would do next. But I was also 
an analyst for the intelligence agencies. When I was not abroad, I would sit with experts from intelligence 
agencies and teach them the ideology and methodology of the diferent groups, such as the diference 
between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. You need to understand that the Taliban follow the Hanai school of 
thought, while al-Qaeda follows the Hanbali school of thought. Rules for jihad are diferent between diferent 
schools of thought.
SB: But how did you see your role in the grander scheme of things? Did you think that you were playing a central 
role in the operations in which you were involved?
MS: When your intelligence reaches President Obama, you know that you are reaching high levels. Several 
people whom I knew in Somalia, Kenya and other places in Africa were terrorist leaders. Especially ater 
2009, when we took out Saleh Ali Nabhan, the one who was behind the terrorist attacks on the American 
Embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, I understood that I had signiicant power to change things 
and take revenge for people who had been hurt. So I felt that my work was reaching very high levels. I never 
returned home without information. It was from my mobile phone and my house that I linked al-Shabaab 
with Anwar al-Awlaki. his is written in the history books now. Without my knowledge about how these 
people think, we would not have been able to predict things. When you have to make people in Somalia or 
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al-Awlaki speak, you have to manipulate them. And you can only do that if you know their mentality and 
what they believe in. I studied Islam and I knew what motivated and drove these people. It all depends on 
what you want them to do. I would argue with al-Awlaki in our email communications. I would call some 
people disbelievers while he would call them believers. It was challenging because I could have fallen out with 
him but I needed to do it to show that I had my own opinions. he CIA said that I could not do it but my way 
turned out to be much better. he CIA and most intelligence agencies do not have real knowledge. You only 
have real knowledge when you live with these people and are part of the group.
SB: How easy was it to penetrate al-Qaeda’s highest command?
MS: For me, it was relatively easy because I was already trusted and tested. he weird thing is that I had 
done things and managed to bump into people whom I later discovered were quite high-ranking. I had met 
the mujahidin in 1998 much before I met Anwar al-Awlaki through mutual friends in Yemen in 2006. I 
already had my name out there and never had to prove anything. hat was one of my beneits. I never had 
to change myself. As an agent I later pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. I was playing a game. hey knew that 
I had conditions. For example, I had diiculties with killing civilians and that is when Nasir al-Wuhayshi 
told me that if he were given a choice between civilians or military targets, he would choose military targets. 
Iniltrating an intelligence oicer is much more problematic than using insiders because he would be tested. 
In Western countries we can use human intelligence and train agents to iniltrate terrorist cells. But, for an 
intelligence oicer to iniltrate terrorist groups abroad, there would be some tests: being sent to the frontline, 
killing people and so on. It is very dangerous for an outsider to enter a terrorist group and work his way 
up to the ranks. He needs to participate in terrorist activities. he Islamic State is one of the most diicult 
terrorist groups to penetrate. Once you are out there, you are not allowed to get back. So most agents who 
travel over there think that they will come back but they will not. A Danish friend of mine, a Muslim convert, 
who decided to work with Danish intelligence, was killed. He was sent to the frontlines, to the worst places, 
where it is most likely that you get killed. hat is a way to test if you are a true believer. You can certainly train 
people in the West to iniltrate the Islamic State but, if you want to really protect minorities in the Middle 
East, military intervention, not espionage, is the only real solution.
SB: What other tactics do you think that work well in the ield?
MS: Female spies are very useful because they can speak to the female members of a terrorist network. his 
gives you a complete understanding of any person that you want to target. So, for example, a female spy 
talking to Anwar al-Awlaki’s wife would be able to ofer a picture that complemented my own assessment 
of him. It enriched my understanding of the man. Intelligence agencies rarely have both angles of the 
personality of a key terrorist. Also, foot soldiers are never told the plans before they are ready. A facilitator 
– the role I played – is in a better position to get information. Leaders need to see a beneit in you as a 
facilitator and, unless they can do that, they will not speak to you about anything. But once they ask you for 
something, you can ind out what their plans are. When al-Awlaki asked me to bring some hexamine tablets, 
we knew that these were to make detonators.
SB: How did you end up targeting Anwar al-Awlaki?
MS: In the beginning the task with Anwar al-Awlaki was just to collect information. In fact, the CIA were 
not interested in him. Later, they realized how dangerous al-Awlaki was and that my predictions were 
accurate and my work useful. I predicted a jihadi uprising in Lebanon. I helped to identify terror suspects 
in Denmark. I delivered a bugged blackberry to Saleh Ali Nabhan [an al-Qaeda operative wanted for his 
suspected role in the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi] who would be killed three months later. he 
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mission moved from collecting information to taking al-Awlaki out. he CIA sent me to meet up with him 
in Yemen in October 2008, a month ater the attack on the American Embassy in Yemen. I had to bring him 
a laptop, solar panels and a night-vision goggle that he requested: some were planted with spy sotware. I also 
gave him $5,000 cash from the CIA. Al-Awlaki asked me whether he could buy guns with the money and I 
said ‘yes.’ My Danish handlers later told me that I had been tested and passed the test. Refusing him to use the 
money to buy guns would have been an indication that the money was from an intelligence agency: terrorists 
know that intelligence agencies cannot pay for weapons. I stayed in touch with him by email. We shared 
an email account where we would save messages as drat to be read but not sent so as to avoid intelligence 
agencies reading them. When I met him back in 2009, he was more concerned about security. He would not 
use electronic tools, such as the Internet or mobile phones. He asked me to use encrypted message sotware 
called ‘Mojahedeen Secrets’ which was used by al-Qaeda members around the world. On another stay in 
Yemen in 2011 there were two couriers involved in passing messages to him: al-Awlaki trusted them but they 
were low rank and expendable.
SB: hat is very interesting. How much operational independence did you have in the ield?
MS: British intelligence, for example, had to tick boxes. hey would tell me ‘when you go to Yemen you have 
to do A, B and C.’ hey wanted to tell me what to do in Yemen! I would fold their paper and throw it away. 
I would do the exact opposite. hey would tell me ‘when you go out of the airport, turn right.’ I would turn 
let and that would generate the best intelligence. I was acting totally independently. I improvised. I designed, 
planned and executed the missions. More or less I did whatever I wanted to. At the beginning the Danes just 
gave me two plastic bags with mobile phones saying ‘here are your mobile phones.’ I knew nothing about 
mobile phones – I could hardly use a laptop. I had to pretend to sell drugs and had to make a fake drugs sale 
in front of some of my mates to show my source of income. But it was myself improvising it. All what I had 
from the intelligence agencies was approval and funding. I could do anything I liked. Sometimes there were 
goals in terms of collecting certain information or meeting an operative, and I always did it and came back 
with more. Not only would I come back conirming that two people were connected but I could tell the whole 
story. I could also train and recruit people. I trained a former British Royal Marines reserve and made him 
become a Muslim. He wanted to make a diference. Initially, I did not tell him who I was. I asked him ‘are 
you sure that you want to make a change?’ He said ‘yes.’ I checked his mentality and I thought that he could 
deinitely be used in the War on Terror. I suggested that he iniltrated groups and became a useful person for 
the intelligence agencies. So, I spent my own money to train him. here was no authorization. It was all my 
own initiative and, in fact, the Brits stopped it in the end.
SB: What other operational liberties did you have?
MS: If I was in Yemen and I was asked to execute a prisoner to prove my loyalty, I was given permission 
by British intelligence to do it. I was also trained in weapon handling by the Danish Special Taskforce. I 
was not trained to shoot al-Qaeda members but government soldiers. he only reason you have to refrain 
from shooting is if you face American soldiers. But I could shoot Yemeni soldiers even if they were ighting 
the same exact war against al-Qaeda. If I did kill an American Muslim, I needed to do a so-called ‘elevator 
meeting’, where I had to disclose the killing but I would not be prosecuted. I had in these respects a license to 
kill but I was not there to actively kill people.
SB: And did you encounter any particular operational challenge?
MS: A main challenge was traveling through checkpoints. I had to negotiate at each checkpoint. I am not 
talking about bribes but I had to argue. My wife would be with me so we would say that we had to visit her 
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family. I had travelled illegally through Yemen and in outlawed areas before meeting my wife. But it was 
easier with her. Also, when I arrived to a Muslim country and had to wear Middle Eastern clothes it was very 
weird. So stepping in and out of character was quite diicult. On the airplane on my way from the UK to 
Yemen, I would listen to Metallica to wind myself up. But as soon as I arrived in Yemen, that music would 
be of and I would step into the character. Sometimes, I had three or four characters in one single day: being 
Murad; being a dad to my kids, so not inluencing them in an Islamic way; being a bushcrat instructor; and, 
then, being a husband. It was like trying to ind out who I was. Sometimes it was really diicult. he easiest 
of all of the four identities was being a Muslim because that is what I had been for ten years. It was the easiest 
side of me but, at the same time, it was an act because I did not believe in it any more. In fact, it was just a 
memory. It was hypocritical when I said Inshallah, Alhamdulillah or Subhan Allah, which have a religious 
meaning and purpose. I also had to pray. Imagine when I had to pray with other guys. I just did not believe 
in it at all in my heart. I did the movements and totally acted. But I think that I did very well in maintaining 
cover. You need to maintain a certain interest in these people or they will know that you are a spy. Oten spies 
make a mistake because they are not fully integrated in the beliefs of these people. I could argue with al-
Qaeda members but I would do it in a religiously sound way that would be justiied and would give me some 
space.
SB: Did you face any particular personal challenge as a double agent?
MS: My real diiculty was to ind who I was in my private life. I had to live with that emptiness of never 
believing in myself. I had diferent personalities and diferent names: Morten Storm, Murad Storm, Abu 
Osama, Abu Mujahid, Polar Bear, Dalmar and so on. It is a crazy lifestyle. It was very diicult in the 
beginning but now I am totally comfortable. hings have settled. But at that time, from going to believe that 
there is certainty in your life the day ater, to aterwards not believing it, it was very empty. he double life 
was very diicult and very stressful. Especially ater terrorist groups started launching attacks in the West, it 
was very diicult to realize that you are responsible for another human life. I am proud of what I did but I do 
not feel happy about people being killed. You ask yourself the question: is there anything I could have done to 
prevent the attacks? I could only speak with one psychiatrist from MI5 but he did not really do much for me. 
I started using cocaine to numb the reality of my life and I developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
Instead of getting higher, I would get low on cocaine, otherwise my brain would overdrive. It was self-
medicating. Every time that I drove my kids back to their mother, I did not know whether I would see them 
again. If I had died, they would have thought that I was a terrorist. hese are some of the things that continue 
to haunt me today. You are an agent but you receive no recognition or respect in the end.
SB: Did you ever tell anyone that you were working as a double agent?
MS: I told my mother, two of my best friends and two friends from my outdoor company to whom I paid 
a salary every month with my own money. My mother believed it but my friends thought that it was a lie. I 
wanted them to know that I was no longer Murad and I was Morten. But they were non-Muslim because I 
would never trust Muslims, even if they were non-practicing. I could not aford to ‘gamble’ with Muslims. I 
introduced one friend to my radical network in Denmark and they thought that he was just a guy who was 
working for me. I asked him to mention that the outdoor company was going really well and he did it.
SB: Who else knew about your undercover work?
MS: he only other people who knew about me were my handlers and the chiefs of intelligence plus some 
IT experts from the CIA whom I met in Copenhagen. Also, a few people within IT in the British intelligence 
knew me because they wanted to teach me some things with the laptop: for example, how to hide information 
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so that it could not be found unless you know how to do it. A few instructors in the Danish military 
intelligence also knew who I was although they did not know the details of my mission. But they are clever 
because you do not exist: on the receipts my name was ‘Ali G.’ and people in the system would not know who 
I was. If I were killed in the ield, they would have no reference.
SB: How did you actually manage to work with four diferent intelligence agencies at the same time?
MS: I did not have loyalty to any intelligence agency or country. I am a free-thinking human being and I 
myself judge what is right and wrong. For this reason, intelligence agencies understood that I was a loose 
cannon. hey understood that I would not be loyal. As much as they were using me to gather information, I 
was using them to combat evil: I could not do it all on my own. But I was not there to dance to the music. I 
was there to deliver sound information and make serious change.
SB: But how could they trust you?
MS: he security services never had any doubt. I never lied to them because we would end up in a situation 
where we lacked trust. I was so honest that, if I made a mistake, I would correct myself. I genuinely believed 
that this was my call. But ater calling the Americans ‘terrorists’ during a meeting with CIA and MI6 in 
Copenhagen because of a strike that had killed civilians, the Americans asked the Danes whether I was at 
risk of reverting to Islam again. I was just honest about my opinions and I did not want to be a hypocrite. But 
during almost six years of work with intelligence agencies, they became like a family. I constantly had three 
handlers from Danish intelligence and two handlers from British intelligence. I could call them round the 
clock to speak with those to whom I wanted to speak. he Americans were never directly in contact unless 
we were meeting up in Denmark or in the UK.
SB: Did the four intelligence agencies have diferent priorities?
MS: here were diferences in how to proceed and how to achieve the goals. he Americans are cowboys, if 
I can say so. I really mean it. hey think that they can buy your loyalty with money. hey have no knowledge 
about the things that they do. heir interest is to get people killed and to buy loyalties. Once they have what 
they want from you, they drop you out. he methods of reaching those goals would even include sending 
people into danger. he Brits are more calculating and patient. It is much more about gathering information, 
analyzing and preventing. he Danes were a joke. hey were just there to party. hey feel important about 
sitting at the important tables but they were just there to serve cofee during meetings with the CIA and the 
Brits.
SB: But did they operate diferently?
MS: Well, when the Brits pulled out of the mission with Aminah [details below] and Anwar, the Danes told 
me that I should go with the Americans. ‘Forget the Brits, it is more fun with the Americans’, they said. 
hese intelligence agencies used to bad mouth each other the whole time. he Brits hated the Americans. 
he Danes looked down on the Brits because they are too formal and too bureaucratic while they [the 
Danes] were more freestyle. he Americans were into money and it was more like an action movie. But these 
intelligence agencies do not trust each other. It was diicult for me because I really liked the Brits more than 
the others. hey never broke one promise. hey would never promise something that they could not fulill 
and they would never say ‘yes’ unless they meant it. hey were interested in me getting a career out of it 
unlike the other agencies that just wanted to use me and considered me disposable. I chose the Americans 
because of the Danish government and because of the opportunities of an adventurous experience. If I had 
chosen the Brits, I would probably still be working for them. hey spent money to train me. hey never 
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trained me with weapons, which the Danes did. But the Brits trained me in roleplaying, which was more 
useful. But there were some operational diferences. It was a big experience to see the diference between the 
various intelligence agencies. Certain things were not allowed by the Brits but were allowed by the Danes 
because they worked with the Americans. So, I had to go to Denmark to do this kind of things. For example, 
once the Brits gave me a laptop to provide to a terrorist so that information could be extracted, but when 
I arrived in Denmark the Danes took the laptop away and gave me an American laptop. hey were almost 
working against one another.
SB: Was there any aspect that you particularly enjoyed about your work?
MS: he good parts were going back and giving information, seeing the enjoyment and surprise on the 
faces of my handlers, how they got excited because they could see that we were getting higher and higher. 
But I also liked the excitement of travelling to diferent countries. I also found it amusing when low-ranking 
counter-terrorism oicers at airports stopped me: I used to play around with them. hey would not know 
who I was. Once, I was returning from Yemen and they tried to interrogate me: they wanted to recruit me 
without knowing that I had already been recruited. I sat in an interrogation room where they were telling 
me that Islam is a peaceful religion and I told them ‘no, you are absolutely wrong!’ hey were very surprised 
and then they asked me to help. I responded ‘no’ [laughs]. he government never told these lower-ranking 
people that I was working for them because they were scared that the information could spread. he funding 
is also unlimited. If I wanted to justify going to Kenya or to hailand or to Indonesia, they would just fund 
it without questioning. To see the Americans and the Brits ight over me, latter me, try to buy me with trips 
to the ice hotel in Iceland, just to see how desperate they were to have me on their team – that was very 
empowering.
SB: Did you ever have any doubt about your covert work?
MS: I was never in doubt about my covert work, but I had two issues. I had to lie to people whom I used to 
call friends and I worked to have them killed. About thirty people were killed. You do not arrest these people. 
It was diicult for me because I understood why they did those things. I understood their motivations. hey 
believed those were the right things to do. When you are on their side you know how generous they are. hey 
would give their lives to protect you. It hurts a lot to betray them. he other diicult thing for me was to work 
with the government and the police. I come from a background where we would never speak with the police 
but deal ourselves with problems within our own community. In my pre-Muslim life with the Bandidos, I 
never answered police questions. hey had tried for six years, but I never ever said a single word to them. I 
had diiculties in explaining to myself that I was cooperating with Danish authorities.
SB: Did you have many frictions with the intelligence agencies that you were working with?
MS: Sometimes, they were naïve. I set up al-Awlaki with a third wife, a Croatian Muslim convert called 
Aminah. he CIA’s plan was to plant a tracking device in her luggage so that it would lead them to al-Awlaki 
in Yemen. When I had to meet Aminah in Vienna, the Americans had set me up with all surveillance ready 
into a pub. hey had no clue. She is a Muslim and the CIA asked me to meet up with her in a pub. I changed 
the plan and took her to a McDonald’s instead. he CIA were really angry and thought that I went rogue. 
But in the end, it went well and we took her to Yemen. I was paid $250,000 from the CIA for that mission. I 
spent half of the money setting up my covert outdoors company, Storm Bushcrat. I wanted to run something 
in Kenya and similar places where I could still be semi-involved but not ‘full-time.’ Perhaps we could have 
prevented the Westgate attack because my contact there – Ikrimah [a top al-Shabaab commander whose real 
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name is believed to be Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir] – was later involved in it. I used the rest of the money 
to buy cocaine because I could not deal with the stress.
SB: How did your relationship with intelligence agencies deteriorate in the end?
MS: he Americans refused to speak with me for six months ater Aminah’s plan failed. I managed to get 
her to Yemen, but she was told by al-Qaeda operatives to dump the suitcase before she met with al-Awlaki. 
So, the CIA did not manage to track al-Awlaki. Six months later, the Danes texted me saying that they had 
completely lost track of al-Awlaki and the Americans needed my help again. hey promised a $5 million 
reward for eliminating him. But ater we took him out, the CIA said that his death was not due to my work. 
My Danish handler, Klang, sent me a message saying ‘I’m so sorry but it wasn’t us.’ Several days later, I picked 
up a copy of he Telegraph. It said that al-Awlaki was tracked by capturing a low-level errand-runner. he 
dates, the time-period when he was arrested, and the fact that the courier was a young man all matched with 
my mission. I was very angry! Danish intelligence ofered me £225,000 to keep silent. I was poor and did not 
know how to survive but I still refused. I remained poor, but at least I kept my dignity. I made up with Danish 
intelligence a few months ago but then fell out again ater they failed to deliver on a promise that they had 
made.
SB: What sort of support have you received since leaving the ield?
MS: I receive no personal support or security details. In the summer of 2013, members of the Islamic State 
shot at pictures of myself and other ive Danes in Syria. I cannot move back to Denmark, because it is too 
diicult. I cannot get a name protection or any protection from the Danish government. You can pay £5 and 
you get access to protected addresses, so I would be dead within six months if I moved back to Denmark. he 
UK is much safer, because you do not have to register where you live. I live under diferent names anyway.
SB: Morten, thank you very much for this interview.
About the interviewer: Stefano Bonino is a Lecturer in Criminology at Northumbria University and a Fellow 
of the Royal Society of Arts.
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Interviewer’s Notes
his interview formed part of a Northumbria University approved project entitled ‘Disrupting Terrorist 
Groups: An Agent’s Perspective.’ he original face-to-face interview was conducted at an undisclosed location 
in the United Kingdom in November 2015. Parts of the interview were subsequently re-arranged and 
integrated with publicly available information included in the CNN Special Report ‘Double Agent Inside al 
Qaeda for the CIA’ aired on 16 September 2014 and in the article ‘Morten Storm: A Radical Life’ published in 
he Telegraph on 3 December 2012. Morten Storm conirmed the resulting, edited interview presented here 
to be an accurate description of his experiences and views in January 2016.
Morten Storm’s story has been neither conirmed nor denied by the Politiets Eterretningstjeneste, the 
Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and the Central Intelligence Agency. he interviewer and 
author of this text, Stefano Bonino, was not in a position to establish contact with any of these intelligence 
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agencies to verify the claims made in this interview. However, the book Agent Storm: My Life Inside al Qaeda 
and the CIA, which Morten Storm co-authored with Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister for Atlantic Monthly 
Press in 2014, provides evidence for several of Storm’s claims. Readers wishing to explore some episodes 
referred to in this interview in more detail are advised to consult the book.
